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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
To many students of philosophy, especially 
within the predominantly British tradition as we 
know it in Australia, Clarence Irving Lewis remains 
something of a mystery. His writings are 
conspicuously absent from the prescribed reading 
lists in Australian universities. Despite this 
remoteness, however, his name has always carried 
with it a respect which is customarily reserved 
for those who have been significantly influential 
in their own domain, 
It was this seeming paradox between Lewis's 
stature and his remoteness that first attracted me 
- as much out of curiosity as anything else. This 
curiosity was further aroused by the obvious 
contrast between Australia and North America 
viii 
where interest in Lewis's work is so much greater, 
There was yet another factor which caught my interest. 
It was obvious that Lewis ranked among the more 
important philosophers of this century. There were 
signs of his influence in so many areas of 
philosophical discussion. Yet it puzzled me 
that in this age of prolific publications there 
was not a single volume devoted to the study of 
Lewis 1 s worko 
These were the factors Which first prompted 
me to think in terms of searching for some well 
defined area in Lewis 1 s work which would lend 
itself to a study of this kind. On reading Lewis 
it became clear to me that these accidents of 
history which had first attracted me were, in 
a sense, by-products of the very nature of Lewis's 
philosophical work, One historical commentator 
has expressed this very succinctly: 
1 
C.I. Lewis was one of the most 
indomitable, intransigent, and 
gifted philosophers of our time, 
surely a pragmatist, perhaps 
the greatest, but one never 
really in the pocket of any 
school or technique. His life 
was given to our discipline, 
and his endowments and energies 
produced substantial contributions 
in several fields, notably logic, 
epistemology, and axiology. His 
work was placed squarely where 
he wanted it, regardless of the 
compelling millieu of our day, 
and I think we might say that 
he was one of those rare 
philosophers among us whose 
contemporaries included such 
men as Hume and Kant. 1 
J. Lange, "The Late Papers of C.I. Lewis",~ 
Journal of the History of Philos~, Vol.4, 1966, 
p,2J5o 
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It is, I believe, this last fact which sets 
Lewis apart. He may well have been the last of 
the system-builders; in this regard he is certainly 
not a typical twentieth century philosopher. Lewis 
retained a kind of Kantian architectonic: ethics 
could not be viewed apart from epistemology; and 
epistemology could not be isolated from logic. 
For Lewis, the philosophical enterprise was a 
single whole. 
An immediate consequence of this is that 
it is difficult to read any isolated portions of 
Lewis; the fragments presuppose a considerable 
understanding of the system as a whole. By this 
I mean that there are some fundamental philosophical 
issues which form the foundation for much of Lewis's 
thinking. These issues are reflected in a tightly 
knit vocabulary whose full significance is only 
available to those who are intimately familiar with 
his system. Consequently the effort involved in 
coming to grips with Lewis is qualitatively different 
from that which is typically required in the 
contemporary environment. These are the factors 
which have, in part, inhibited the discussion of 
Lewis's philosophy. 
X 
This dissertation presents a discussion of 
a cluster of philosophical doctrines which lie at 
the very heart of Lewis's philosophy. Throughout 
Lewis's philosophical career two questions presented 
themselves repeatedly: why do we regard some 
statements as necessarily true, and how do we 
determine what some term or statement means? 
In discussing Lewis's answer to these questions 
my purpose has been twofold. They are important 
philosophical questions. Consequently I have made 
some effort to place the discussion in a wider 
philosophical context. This is particularly the 
case in Chapters I, II and V. My major purpose, 
however, has been to penetrate to the roots of 
Lewis's philosophy. These roots, I believe, lie 
in his theory of meaning and in the doctrines 
that surround his views on the a priori and the 
analytic. To this extent this dissertation is 
only an introduction to Lewis. It does not extend 
to a general discussion of his epistemology though 
he has much of interest to say about empirical 
knowledge as well as a prio£i knowledge; nor does 
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it extend to a discussion of his views on valuation 
although he sees direct links between all of these topics. 
Lewis makes it quite clear that he regards 
the analysis of the a priori and the analytic as 
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a prerequisite for any other philosophical endeavour. 
In the case of Lewis's own philosophical writings it 
is certainly true that these doctrines are fundamental, 
and if this study contributes to the understanding of 
Lewis my purpose will have been achieved. 
